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ARTICLES
Management-Based Strategies for Improving Private-Sector
Environmental Performance
by Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash
Editors’ Summary: Improvements in environmental quality depend in large
measure on changes in private-sector management. In recognition of this fact,
government and industry have begun in recent years to focus directly on shaping the internal management practices of private firms. New managementbased strategies can take many forms, but unlike conventional regulatory approaches they are linked by their distinctive focus on management practices
rather than on environmental technologies or emissions targets. This Article
offers the first sustained treatment of both public- and private-sector initiatives
focused specifically on improving firms’ environmental management. Synthesizing the results of a conference of leading scholars and policymakers organized by the Regulatory Policy Program at Harvard University, Cary
Coglianese and Jennifer Nash consider whether management-based strategies
can lead to improved environmental outcomes and, if so, how they should be designed to be most effective. They report research findings showing that management-based strategies can yield improvements in industry’s environmental
performance, indicating that anyone concerned about environmental quality
should seriously consider the use of these strategies. Nevertheless, the authors
urge caution about overstating what can be accomplished through management-based strategies, as they will not always lead to significant change in private-sector firms’ environmental performance. Although management-based
strategies are unlikely to become the mainstay of society’s approach to environmental protection, they nevertheless deserve greater consideration because of
the positive contribution they can make in certain circumstances.
Introduction
Improvements in environmental quality depend in large
measure on decisions made by private-sector managers. For
decades, government regulators and others interested in environmental protection tried to affect these decisions by altering incentives so that businesses would achieve a desired
Cary Coglianese is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program at the School’s Center for Business and Government.
His interdisciplinary research focuses on issues of regulation and administrative law, with a particular emphasis on the empirical evaluation of alternative and innovative regulatory strategies and the role of disputing and
negotiation in regulatory policymaking. His work has appeared in, among
other journals, the Administrative Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Law &
Society Review, Michigan Law Review, Stanford Law Review, and University of Pennsylvania Law Review. He is the founder and co-chair of the
Law & Society Association’s international collaborative research network
on regulatory governance, vice chair of the e-rulemaking committee of the
American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Administrative and Regulatory
Practice Section, and vice chair of the Committee on Innovation, Management Systems, and Trading of the ABA’s Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources. He has also been a visiting professor of law at Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Vanderbilt Univer-

level of emissions or would adopt specified pollution control technologies. While these traditional performancebased and technology-based regulatory strategies have
worked well to spur private managers to make the investments needed to reduce some of their firms’ negative envisity. He is a recipient of two Resources for the Future (RFF) fellowships in
regulatory implementation as well as the American Political Science Association’s Edward S. Corwin Award for his research on environmental
litigation. He received his J.D., M.P.P., and Ph.D. from the University of
Michigan and is a member of the bar of the state of Michigan and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Jennifer Nash is Director of the Regulatory Policy Program at the John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. She conducts
empirical research on emerging trends in government regulation and industry self-regulation. She has published on a variety of environmental
management and policy topics in journals such as: Administrative Law Review; Annual Review of Energy and the Environment; Business, Strategy,
and the Environment; California Management Review; and Environment.
Her current research explores the effectiveness of performance- and management-based regulatory strategies in achieving policy goals, the role of
voluntary programs in improving the environmental performance of
firms, and the impact of industry codes on corporate social responsibility.
Coglianese and Nash coedited Regulating From the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? (2001), the first
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ronmental impacts,1 they have tended to treat the firm itself
as a “black box,” imposing requirements for specific means
or outcomes without regard for the overall way that firms
manage their environmental impacts.2
More recently, both government and industry have begun
to explore innovative alternatives that seek directly to shape
the internal management practices of private firms. Rather
than treating private firms as proverbial black boxes, these
new strategies focus squarely on management and seek to
provide incentives for firms to develop management practices that in turn can lead to improved environmental outcomes. Government and the private sector are using management-based strategies to address a broad range of environmental concerns. For example, in Massachusetts, the
legislature has attempted to reduce the risks from toxic
chemicals not by requiring managers of manufacturing facilities to meet emissions limits or to install pollution control technology, but instead by requiring them to engage in
management effort to develop toxic use reduction plans.3
Similarly, U.S. automakers require their suppliers to adopt
environmental management systems (EMS) as a requirement for doing business,4 and the American Forest and Paper Association requires its members to adopt a set of management practices directed toward sustainable forestry.5
Decisionmakers in government and the private sector are
turning to management-based strategies for several reasons.
book to examine the policy implications of emerging trends in private-sector environmental management. They are currently co-editing a second
volume, Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based Strategies
for Improving Environmental Performance, to be published by RFF Press
later this year and which will include the research discussed in this Article.
The authors acknowledge support from the Charles G. Koch Charitable
Foundation, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Policy,
Economics, and Innovation Grant No. R-83056701, American Chemistry
Council, RFF/RFF Press, the Multi-State Working Group Policy Academy, and the Center for Business and Government at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government. They also appreciate research assistance by Ben
Gerber and helpful comments from Terry Davies, Donald Elliott, and Tom
Lyon. This Article represents the authors’ synthesis of the perspectives
that emerged at a 2003 workshop sponsored by the Regulatory Policy Program and does not necessarily reflect the views of all the workshop participants. In order to facilitate open dialogue at the workshop, discussion was
held on a not-for-attribution basis, so statements and ideas contained in
this Article are for that reason not identified here with the names of specific workshop participants. The appendix to this Article, however, contains a list of all the individuals who participated in the workshop.
1. See generally J. Clarence Davies & Jan Mazurek, Industry
Incentives for Environmental Improvement: An Evaluation of U.S. Federal Initiatives (1996) (Report to the Global Environmental Management Initiative); Derek Bok, The State of
the Nation: Government and the Quest for a Better Society (1996).
2. James Salzman & Barton H. Thompson Jr., Environmental Law and Policy (2003) (“[E]nvironmental law as a whole
treats factories as giant black boxes, refusing to look at what happens inside.”).
3. Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, §50.40 (2004).
4. Press Release, Ford Motor Company, Ford Becomes First U.S.
Automaker to Require Suppliers to Achieve ISO 14001 Certification
(Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author); Press Release, General Motors
Corporation, General Motors Sets New Level of Environmental Performance for Suppliers (Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author); see
also R.C. Wilson, Ford Spreads the Word About Its EMS Success, 33
Pollution Engineering 6 (2001).
5. Errol Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 211, 239 (2003); Jennifer Nash, Industry
Codes of Practice: Emergence and Evolution, in New Tools for
Environmental Protection: Education, Information, and
Voluntary Measures 235, 237 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern
eds., 2002).
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These strategies take advantage of the fact that private-sector managers have the best knowledge about how to bring
about appropriate changes within their organizations and industries.6 Management-based strategies seek to leverage the
private sector’s informational advantage by encouraging
managers to identify and reduce their facilities’most significant impacts. Interest in management-based strategies is
also fueled by the perception that conventional regulatory
strategies may be ill-suited for addressing the environmental problems most vexing to policymakers today. For example, problems such as chemical accidents, which are often
the result of dynamic interactions inside organizations, are
not easy for regulators to solve using technology- or performance-based tools.7 A management-based strategy that requires managers to identify sources of risk, develop a plan
for addressing them, and monitor the implementation of
their plans might be a more effective approach. Finally, people are turning to management-based strategies simply out
of growing acceptance that what goes on inside the black
box of the firm is of critical importance for overall environmental quality. The size of a firm’s environmental footprint
is not pre-determined by the raw materials it uses and the
products or services it produces. Firms working in the same
sector—and subject to the same competitive and regulatory
pressures—can have starkly different environmental profiles depending on how they are managed.
To explore the promise and the performance of management-based strategies for environmental improvement, the
Regulatory Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University organized a research
conference that brought together some of the nation’s leading scholars as well as leaders from government, business,
and nongovernmental organizations. The conference
aimed to evaluate experiences with management-based
strategies and draw lessons for future public- and privatesector developments. This Article synthesizes and extends
central themes and issues that emerged from the conference discussion and highlights unresolved issues that merit
further research.
The Article begins by defining what we mean by management-based strategies and offering examples of their use by
both the public and private sectors. It then turns to the role of
management in organizations and explores the issue of how
much management affects environmental performance
compared with other social, economic, and regulatory variables. The Article next considers four empirical studies of
the impact of different applications of management-based
strategies. The results of this research suggest that management-based strategies can sometimes play a role in bringing
about improvements in firms’ environmental performance.
To be sure, the effectiveness of management-based strategies is by no means assured or always significant; their success depends on the conditions under which they are used as
well as the way that they are designed. Important design
considerations include the incentives that are offered;
whether the strategy seeks to promote management plan6. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 691, 695 (2003) (management-based approaches
“place responsibility for [decisionmaking] with those who possess
the most information about risks and potential control methods”).
7. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With HighRisk Technologies (1984).
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ning by itself or also the implementation of plans; the specificity of any standards for management practices; the
amount and type of information collected by the firm and
shared with outsiders; the role of auditing; and the nature
and level of community involvement. The Article concludes
by examining the question of when management-based
strategies are likely to be more effective than traditional performance- and technology-based approaches.
I. What Are Management-Based Strategies?
Management refers to the coordination of an organization’s
operational activities toward a specified set of objectives.8 It
includes practices such as planning, goal setting, staffing,
training, analysis, and control. Such management practices
have long been used by businesses and are by now ubiquitous throughout industry. Every day, private-sector managers use planning, monitoring, analysis, training, and control
to achieve business objectives such as improving the efficiency of their operations or the quality of their products
and services.
What we call management-based strategies are attempts
to require or encourage a set of targeted firms or organizations to use basic management practices in ways that align
their actions and outcomes with broader social objectives.
Management-based strategies, as we define them, are used
by those outside an organization to change the management
practices and behaviors of those on the inside. Government
regulators, for example, have used management-based strategies in a variety of important areas, including pharmaceuticals, food safety, and health care institutions.9 In the
environmental domain, both government agencies and
various private-sector institutions are using managementbased strategies to achieve a broad range of objectives. Examples include:
· Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) have adopted management-based regulations in an effort to prevent cata8. Morgan Wizel, Management: The Basics (2004).
9. In its regulation of the quality of pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) is moving toward a management-based
framework called the Pharmaceutical Current Good Manufacturing
Practice, which when finalized will seek to encourage industry managers to implement systems to identify, analyze, fix, and prevent
quality problems. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Pharmaceutical cGMPs for the 21st Century—A Risk-Based Approach (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp
2004/GMP_finalreport2004.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). The
FDA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are also using
a management-based strategy to improve the safety of juice, seafood, and meat by requiring firms to implement a system called Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) to identify and
control pathogens. Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing
and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6137 (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified
as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 60 Fed.
Reg. 65095 (Dec. 18, 1995) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pts.
123 and 1240); Final Rule on Pathogen Reduction and HACCP Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38806 (July 25, 1996). The accreditation standards for hospitals have become similarly management-based.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Hospital Patient Safety Standards (2001), available
at http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives.asp?durki=2973
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005); see generally Troyen A. Brennan &
Donald M. Berwick, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and
the Quality of American Health Care (1995).
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strophic accidents at facilities that use large quantities of hazardous chemicals.10 Under these rules,
industrial facilities must engage in a risk assessment of their operations, develop procedures designed to prevent accidents, and seek to make
continuous improvements in the management of
their operations.11
· EPA’s National Environmental Performance
Track, the Agency’s flagship voluntary environmental program, recognizes and rewards firms
that have met regulatory requirements, implemented EMS, and set goals for making further
environmental improvements.12 Several states,
including Texas and Virginia, have adopted similar programs.13
· The American Chemistry Council requires
chemical manufacturing firms to implement a
Responsible Care ® management system and
have it externally verified as a condition for membership. Managers must implement management
practices to engage the community, prevent pollution, and operate their plants safely, among
other objectives.14
· The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has developed an EMS standard, known
as ISO 14001, that facilities anywhere in the world
can use as a guide for managing their environmental impacts. ISO 14001 calls for facilities to develop a system for setting their own firm-specific
environmental performance goals, and then for assessing progress and correcting problems.15
As these examples show, management-based strategies
can take a wide variety of forms and can be adopted by a variety of organizations, including government agencies,
trade associations, and other standard-setting bodies. Nev10. Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 57
Fed. Reg. 6356 (Feb. 24, 1992) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1910); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg.
31668 (June 20, 1996) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68); see
generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6, at 698-99.
11. 57 Fed. Reg. at 6356.
12. See generally National Environmental Performance Track,
Building on the Foundation, Performance Track Second
Annual Progress Report (2004), available at http://www.epa.
gov/performancetrack/PT_2nd_progress_rpt_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (also available from the ELR Guidance & Policy
Collection, ELR Order No. AD04985).
13. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (Apr. 24, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/
states/programs/va_moa.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2005); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/states/
programs/tx_moa.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
14. Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation
Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 Acad. Mgmt. J. 698, 699-700 (2000).
15. Jennifer Nash et al., ISO 14001 and EPA’s Region I’s Startrack Program, in Research Papers 2, Vol. 1, Environment.gov: Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century
15-17 (Nat’l Academy of Pub. Admin. 2000); Jerry Speir, EMSs and
Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in Regulating From
the Inside 198, 217 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001)
(“ISO 14001 guarantees no particular level of performance, and
without supplementation, it provides no public information by
which to judge an organizations performance.”).
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ertheless, they share in common a clear focus on management itself. They all directly seek to influence the attention,
information, authority, and financial resources of managers
toward the achievement of environmental improvements,
but without necessarily requiring them to achieve any
specific outcomes and while also giving them the flexibility
to choose their own measures to reduce their environmental impacts.
Management-based strategies can be classified into four
types, depending on what kind of institution uses them and
the types of incentives that accompany them. We distinguish
between management-based strategies deployed by governmental and nongovernmental institutions. We then distinguish between management-based strategies that mandate
management practices and those that encourage the adoption of improved environmental management. These two
distinctions lead to the typology of management-based
strategies shown in Figure 1. When a government agency

1-2006

such as EPA requires a business to strengthen its internal
management, it is engaging in management-based regulation. When a private organization such as a firm or trade association imposes a similar requirement on its suppliers or
members, it is issuing a management-based mandate. When
government establishes a program to coax (but not require)
firms to improve their environmental management, it uses
management-based incentives. When a private organization
initiates a similar effort to encourage others to improve their
management, it is creating management-based pressure.
In these various ways, governmental and nongovernmental institutions are increasingly requiring or encouraging firms to improve their internal management practices as
a way to improve their environmental performance. But are
these management-based strategies in fact affecting the environmental performance of companies? Why should anyone expect that management-based strategies would lead
firms to reduce their environmental footprints?

Figure 1. Types of Management-Based Strategies
Governmental User

Management
Required

Management
Encouraged

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Non-Governmental User

Management-based
regulation
Examples:
· Risk management planning required
under Clean Air Act §112(r)16
· Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction
Act17

Management-based
mandate
Examples:
· American Chemistry Council’s
Responsible Care Program18
· Ford Motor Company’s requirement
that suppliers become certified to
ISO 1400119

Management-based
incentive
Examples:
· U.S. EPA’s National Environmental
Performance Track20
· Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission’s Clean Texas Program21

Management-based
pressure
Examples:
· Portland Cement Association’s
Cement Manufacturing Sustainability
Program22
· ISO 14001 Standard23

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, Clean Texas
Cleaner World, at http://www.cleantexas.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2005).

22. Press Release, Portland Cement Association, Cement Industry
Adopts Environmental Management Systems (Aug. 5, 2004) available at http://www.cement.org/newsroom/ems20040805.asp (last
visited Oct. 13, 2005); Cement Manufacturing Sustainability
Program, Plans for Future Generations (2004), available at
http://www.cement.org/bookstore/profile.asp?store=&pagenum=
1&pos=0&catID=&id=5728 (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
23. International Organization for Standardization, ISO
14001—Environmental Management Systems—Specification With Guidance for Use (1996).
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II. Does Management Matter?
In order for management-based strategies to work, management itself must be an important factor causally related to
environmental outcomes. Is management the right place to
look for improvements in environmental performance?
How much does management matter? The opening session
of the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference addressed
these initial questions.
The session began with a presentation by Prof. Robert A.
Kagan of the University of California, Berkeley, in which he
reported findings from a study of pulp and paper mills in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.24
Professor Kagan and his research collaborators found that
firms exhibited different management styles reflecting managers’ attitudes toward environmental issues, their responsiveness to various pressures for environmental improvement, and the steps they took to implement environmental
policies. Professor Kagan classified firms’ environmental
management styles into five ideal types.25 These ideal types
include, on one end of the spectrum, the “true believers”
who voluntarily invest in state-of-the-art practices and actively search for ways to improve their performance even
beyond what they are required to do by law. At the other end
of the spectrum lie “environmental laggards” who resist
even complying with their basic legal obligations. In between these two extremes are “environmental strategists,”
“committed compliers,” and “reluctant compliers,” each of
whom have varying degrees of commitment to excellence in
managing their operations in ways that go beyond what they
are required to do by law.
Professor Kagan has found that management style is an
important factor influencing environmental performance.
Not surprisingly, true believers and environmental strategists achieve better environmental results than those that do
not comply with regulations or only comply reluctantly.
Firms that are committed and systematic about managing
their environmental impacts tend to perform better in terms
of their impact on environmental quality than firms that are
not so managed, all other things being equal.
Of course, all other things are not always equal. Firms’
environmental performance is affected by more than just
management style. Both performance and style itself can be
affected by community demands, regulatory enforcement,
and economic considerations, such as the financial strength
of the company or its customers’ demands for environmental quality. The importance of these factors was confirmed
not only by the Kagan study of pulp and paper facilities, but
also by the findings from an extensive statistical analysis
presented at the conference by Prof. Paul R. Kleindorfer of
the University of Pennsylvania.26 Drawing on an analysis
of nearly 2,000 chemical accidents at more than 15,000
chemical facilities, Professor Kleindorfer reported that
24. See Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and Corporate Environmental Performance, in Leveraging the Private
Sector: Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Leveraging the Private Sector]; see also
Robert A. Kagan et al., Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment (2003).
25. Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24; Kagan et al.,
supra note 24.
26. See Paul R. Kleindorfer, The RMP Rule and Management-Based
Regulations, in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24.
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economic, regulatory, and community factors are all important drivers of accident and injury rates in this important industrial sector.27
The research presented at the conference highlighted
three important, but as yet unanswered, questions that hold
clear implications for understanding and use of management-based strategies. First, why do firms vary in their environmental management style? In other words, why are some
managers true believers or environmental strategists who
treat environmental management as a high priority, while
others are only reluctant compliers? This is a crucial question for anyone interested in management-based strategies,
since such strategies aim at improving firms’ environmental management. One answer, of course, is that the enforcement of old-style regulations affects managers’ environmental priorities and commitment. Although traditional
regulation may treat firms as black boxes, it nevertheless
provides strong incentives for firms to improve their environmental management. Some firms that are now widely
perceived to be environmental leaders were previously the
targets of major regulatory enforcement actions that
helped their managers “wake up” to the environmental aspects of their operations.28
Participants mentioned a range of additional factors that
may explain why some firms take environmental management more seriously than others. These factors include: the
personal beliefs of corporations’ top managers; the social
pressures that they face in their personal lives or in their
communities, including the impact of consumer boycotts or
community protests; the strategic position firms face within
their sectors; and the extent to which firms’ managers believe there is a strong business case for sound environmental
management.29 A few participants expressed the view that
management style is largely idiosyncratic, determined
mainly by who is sitting at the top of a company’s hierarchy
and what that person figuratively “had for lunch” on any
given day.
Second, what is the relative importance of each of the social, economic, regulatory, and management factors that affect firms’ environmental performance? While conference
participants recognized that each of these types of factors
shapes managers’actions, some factors are likely to be more
important than others. A few conference participants expressed the view that an often unobservable factor—managers’ attitudes or commitment—might be the most important
factor because it not only directly affects the seriousness of a
firm’s management practices, but it may also serve as a filter
through which managers and their employees differentially
perceive the impact of the other factors, such as community,
regulatory, and financial pressures. An important but still
unresolved issue for research will be to assess the degree to
which management practices and managers’ commitment
independently contribute as much as other factors do to a
firm’s environmental performance.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in Regulating From
the Inside 1, 2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (discussing “[t]he experience of the Louisiana-Pacific Corporation”).
29. For general discussion of such factors, see Kagan et al., supra note
24; Aseem Prakash, Greening of the Firm: The Politics of
Corporate Environmentalism (2000); Forest Reinhardt,
Down to Earth: Applying Business Principles to Environmental Management (1999).
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Finally, how should researchers study the role of management in shaping firms’ environmental performance? Several participants noted the need to develop reliable ways of
defining and measuring management in concrete terms using observable characteristics so that researchers can test for
correlation between management and environmental performance. Without such measures, it is easy to conflate
managers’ attitudes and their actions in describing firms’
management styles, when attitudes and actions might be
separate factors affecting corporate environmental performance.30 For example, the mere fact that a facility has implemented an ISO14001-compliant EMS might itself lead
to improvements in firms’ performance, such that the environmental impacts of firms with such EMS tend to be systematically more benign than comparable firms without
such EMS. But there still could be differences among THE
firms THAT HAVE AN EMS, such that those firms with
both an EMS and managers with strong, pro-environment
attitudes perform STILL better. As one participant with extensive experience in environmental management consulting noted, companies that implement EMS because they
want to manage themselves well will experience better results than companies that are pressured to implement EMS.
Alternatively, it could be that implementing an EMS by
itself makes no difference at all, and that firms with strong
pro-environment attitudes improve their performance over
firms without these attitudes, regardless of whether they
have a formal EMS in place. One participant posited that the
presence of an EMS is merely “an epiphenomenon but not
the ‘first cause’” of most firms’performance improvements,
suggesting that the same factors that motivate firms to implement an EMS could also motivate these firms to improve
their environmental performance even without an EMS.
On the other hand, despite being well intentioned and
having a strong commitment to the environment, many
managers may be unable to make strides to reduce their
firms’ environmental impacts without a formal EMS in
place. Performance improvements may very well depend on
the interaction of both attitudes and actions.
Participants did not resolve the issue of the relative importance of attitudes versus actions, but the conference
discussion did highlight the importance of this issue for
those who are deciding whether to pursue managementbased strategies. After all, if the attitudes or commitment
of managers matter most in affecting firms’ environmental
performance, then simply requiring firms to implement certain management actions will probably not lead to the expected performance improvements. If managers need to
change their attitudinal commitment in order for management to matter, it may be much harder to accomplish improved firm performance through types of managementbased strategies.31
30. For a discussion of the difference between management commitment and performance, see Coglianese & Nash, supra note 28, at
16-18.
31. Although there may be reasons to believe that managers’ attitudes
matter independent of certain actions, researchers face difficulties in
measuring managers’ attitudes directly. Since it will be socially acceptable for managers to proclaim their attitudinal commitment to
environmental protection, no matter how important it really is to
them, surveys and structured interviews with managers may not result in valid or accurate attitudinal measures. Fine-grained content
analysis of open-ended interview questions may result in better measures of attitudes. Alternatively, one participant suggested that it is
appropriate to take managers’ actions into account as a way of test-
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III. The Impact of Management-Based Strategies
Management-based strategies provide incentives for firms
to engage in management actions or practices but they do
not necessarily seek to change managers’ attitudes. Government regulators, trade associations, and community groups
who seek to encourage or require firms to improve their environmental management cannot observe or measure attitudes nearly as easily as actions. Management-based strategies therefore focus on rewarding or punishing firms based
on their management practices. What impact do strategies
that seek to improve management practices ultimately have
on firms’ environmental performance?
At the conference, presenters focused on the environmental impacts associated with management-based strategies,
reporting findings from systematic studies aimed at assessing whether these strategies have had demonstrable effects
on firms’ environmental performance. Most of the innovative, management-based efforts at the center of these studies
have been in existence for at least one decade, but until now
have yet to receive any sustained empirical scrutiny.32 As a
result, the empirical studies presented at the conference
shed new light on a variety of prominent public and private
initiatives developed over the last decade. These studies include the following:
· Prof. Lori Snyder Bennear of Duke University
conducted an empirical evaluation of state laws requiring managers to develop pollution prevention
plans.33 During the early 1990s, 14 states implemented laws requiring industrial facilities to engage in planning to reduce their use of toxic chemicals. From a theoretical perspective, Professor
Bennear demonstrated that management-based
regulation could be effective at reducing toxic
chemical releases both by changing the internal
decisionmaking of the plant and through information sharing between regulated entities and the regulator. Professor Bennear also presented new empirical evidence demonstrating that plants subject
to such management-based regulations have experienced greater reductions in toxic chemical releases than they would have in the absence of these
regulatory initiatives. She showed that facilities
subject to these regulations reduced toxic chemicals by nearly 60,000 pounds more than comparable facilities not subject to the regulations.34
· Prof. Richard N.L. Andrews of the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, shared findings from a
ing the validity of any attempt to ask managers about their attitudes.
Such an approach would use managers’ actions effectively as a way
of approximating their revealed preferences about environmental
protection. Yet following such an approach, another participant
noted, poses its own challenges. Researchers seeking ultimately to
untangle the separate effects of attitudes and actions would want to
observe actions that reveal managers’ attitudes but do not correlate
with environmental performance. This will probably be difficult to
do, since the actions of committed managers that lead to the largest
improvements in environmental performance are likely to be the
best signals of managers’ attitudes.
32. Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Evaluating Environmental
Policies, 47 Environment 22 (2005).
33. Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation:
A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox?, in Leveraging the
Private Sector, supra note 24.
34. Id.

Copyright © 2006 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

1-2006

NEWS & ANALYSIS

study of management-based mandates imposed by
industrial customers on their suppliers.35 Professor
Andrews and his collaborators surveyed 3,200
manufacturing facilities in four sectors, comparing
the self-reported environmental performance of facilities that adopted formal EMS in order to comply
with customer mandates with the self-reported performance of firms that were not subject to an EMS
mandate and had not implemented one.36 Their survey results suggested that the mandates led to improved performance in some aspects of firms’operations but not others. Managers in companies that
had implemented an EMS in response to a business
mandate reported more improvements in energy
use, recycling, and reductions in spills and leaks
compared with managers in companies without an
EMS. No significant differences emerged, however, between companies in other aspects of environmental performance.37
· Prof. Jason Scott Johnston of the University of
Pennsylvania shared the results from an empirical
study of the effectiveness of EPA’s Strategic Goals
Program (SGP), a management-based voluntary
program established between EPA and the metal
finishing industry in 1998.38 SGP aimed to spur
firms to adopt improved management practices and
meet ambitious “beyond-compliance” performance goals. Although upward of 300 firms joined
SGP and demonstrated reductions in environmental impacts compared with a 1992 baseline, Professor Johnston concluded that the impact from the
SGP program itself was at best limited. SGP did
help in disseminating information about pollution
prevention throughout the sector, but many of the
environmental improvements made by participating firms occurred before the program was
launched in 1998. Moreover, the program only attracted a small percentage of all the shops in the
metal finishing sector.39
· Tapas Ray and Prof. Kathleen Segerson of the
University of Connecticut studied the impact of an
EPA management-based effort called the Clean
Charles Initiative.40 In the Clean Charles project,
government served as the standard bearer of an
ecosystem-wide performance management initiative that led to significant improvements in water
quality on the Charles River in Boston. Ray and
Professor Segerson showed how EPA’s efforts to
focus management attention on water quality also
brought greater focus to government inspections
and enforcement actions, and they argued that these
35. Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Under
Pressure: How Do Private-Sector Mandates Affect Performance?,
in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of Voluntary Management-Based Reform: An Analysis of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24.
39. Id.
40. Tapas Ray & Kathleen Segerson, Clean Charles 2005 Initiative:
Why the “Success”?, in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra
note 24.
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enforcement actions taken in response to the government’s goal setting played a major role in spurring improvements in environmental management
and water quality.41
Overall, these results suggest that the impacts of management-based strategies can vary from clearly positive to marginal to nonexistent. Conference discussion focused on why
these strategies might work at all in those cases where they
do. A key factor, according to several participants, lies with
the information that management-based strategies generate.
Management-based strategies generally call upon firms to
invest in the production of information about the environmental risks created by their operations and about alternative mitigation measures, as well as to develop procedures
for continued monitoring and information collection. The
information generated through management systems leads
to behavioral change either by: (1) providing feedback directly to decisionmakers within firms about ways to reduce
potential liabilities; or (2) informing outsiders who in turn
bring pressure to bear upon the firms’ decisionmakers.42
Several participants used the oft-used expression “what gets
measured, gets managed” to suggest that knowledge of any
environmental problem is a necessary condition for managers to find a solution.
Management-based strategies seek to provide incentives
for managers to invest in information-gathering. Without
such incentives, firms may not always find it in their interest
to gather the information they need to identify potential opportunities for environmental improvement, even when
these opportunities might bring business advantages to the
firm.43 This is because finding so-called win-win opportunities is not cost-free. Even if the expected business benefits
were positive, they might not be significant enough for managers to justify spending the time and resources needed to
identify the win-win options in the first place. When government agencies or customers either mandate planning or
offer firms incentives to engage in such planning, firms
more readily invest in the search for win-win opportunities.
Once firms undertake a search for information in response
to these incentives, they will be inclined to implement those
opportunities they find that both benefit the environment
and their bottom line.
Conference discussions also examined why management-based strategies might not work as well as some
would hope. A key issue affecting the degree to which
management-based strategies succeed in bringing about
environmental improvement, according to many participants, is the adequacy of incentives. Several participants
stressed that behavioral change requires either changed
attitudes or sufficient incentives, but they questioned
whether management-based strategies could generate either. Without changed attitudes or adequate incentives,
firms may simply go through the motions by creating management systems that make little difference in terms of environmental outcomes.44
41. Id.
42. See Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1227, 1232 (1995).
43. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6, at 703; see also Bennear, supra
note 33, at 10.
44. See Cary Coglianese, Policies to Promote Systematic Environmental Management, in Regulating From the Inside 181, 194 (Cary
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Many participants agreed that the most significant environmental improvements depend upon large capital investments or markedly different business strategies. They
doubted whether any management-based strategy by itself
could lead firms to make such major changes and suggested
the need for government regulation to mandate the use of
specific technologies or to impose stringent performance
standards that necessitate that firms make significant investments or changes in their business strategies. Furthermore,
many firms lack the capacity to make significant environmental improvements regardless of the incentives available
through management-based strategies. Large, multinational
firms often have the capacity to implement sophisticated
and meaningful management systems, but similar progress
probably cannot be expected of small-to-medium sized enterprises or businesses facing a high level of global competition or tight profit margins.45
A few participants expressed skepticism about the efficacy of management-based strategies due to the reluctance
of the private sector to make substantial investments in environmental protection. One participant argued that private-sector initiatives, such as trade association codes of
environmental management, are inherently weak because
industry groups face collective action problems and have a
tendency to promulgate management standards based on
the lowest common denominator. Another participant suggested that even government management-based initiatives
have been watered down due to pressures from industry during implementation.
Finally, the costs of implementing management systems
should not be overlooked; these costs are nontrivial. For example, one participant surmised that complying with the paperwork requirements of the Clean Air Act’s risk management rule—a management-based regulation—demands in
the aggregate close to 100,000 hours of management time
each year and costs tens of millions of dollars.46 A key question for future analysis will be whether the costs of generating information in response to management-based strategies are justified in light of the magnitude of environmental
benefits that result. Ultimately, the net benefits of management-based strategies (that is, environmental benefits minus
compliance costs) should be compared with the net benefits
from alternative environmental strategies, including the
adoption of more conventional forms of regulation.
The conference discussion addressed several potential
complications and challenges for researchers wishing to
study the impact of management-based strategies. A few
participants suggested that absent large capital investments
in pollution control technologies, the environmental improvements associated with systematic environmental management are likely to be marginal and spread across a variety
of areas within a firm’s operations. Consequently, researchers choosing a single measure of environmental perforCoglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (“Policies that merely increase the use of [management systems] may do little to encourage
the sustained commitment needed for firms to make ongoing environmental improvements.”).
45. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving Environmental Management in the Private Sector, 44 Environment
9, 11, 16 (2002).
46. For discussion and analysis of the amount of time and money invested in paperwork requirements, see Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air
Act §112(r)(7), 60 Fed. Reg. 13526, 13541-45 (Mar. 13, 1995).
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mance may well fail to observe any dramatic impact from
management-based strategies even though the cumulative
effect of the individual improvements made across all areas
could be significant. Similarly, several participants suggested that the impacts from management-based efforts
would be less observable in the short term but more likely
to occur over the longer term. This is because information
generated through improved management takes time to
flow throughout a firm to product designers and process
engineers, and consequently the most substantial effects
from management systems may not occur until the next
time the company develops a new product line or production process.
The results from the studies presented at the conference
indicate that management-based strategies do not always
yield dramatic impacts. However, even when management-based strategies do not result in observable changes in
firms’ performance, this does not definitively resolve the
larger question about the impact of management itself. It
could be possible either that firms have not fully responded
to the strategies (perhaps due to insufficient incentives) or
that these strategies have simply prompted firms to adopt
the wrong kind of management practices. The variation in
results from across the empirical studies suggests that the
impact of management-based strategies may depend ultimately on the incentives they provide to firms to improve
their environmental management as well as the way these
strategies are designed.
IV. The Design of Management Systems
As we have seen, management-based strategies do not represent a single approach but actually different kinds of efforts aimed at improving companies’ environmental management and performance.47 Although they share the purpose of fostering effective management, these strategies can
differ along at least two major dimensions that we have described, either one of which could make a difference in the
outcomes achieved. Whether the initiating institution is
governmental or nongovernmental and whether improved
management is required or simply encouraged will shape
the ultimate impact of these management-based strategies.
In addition, participants at the conference identified a
variety of other potentially relevant differences in the design of management-based strategies. These other design
features include:
· Planning Versus Implementation. Managementbased strategies can encourage or require planning
only (leaving it up to firms to decide on their own
whether to implement some or all of their plans), or
they can provide incentives for firms both to engage in planning and to implement their plans.
· Types of Management Actions. The types of actions required or encouraged by managementbased strategies can vary. For example, some management-based strategies call for employee training as part of the preferred management system,
while others do not. Some call for managers to
establish goals consistent with clearly stated performance targets, while others do not stipulate
47. Cf. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 28, at 229 (noting that “EMSs
represent a wide range of approaches”).
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performance targets expected from managers and
their goals.
· Specificity of Actions. Expectations for planning
and management actions can be general or specific.
For example, some state pollution-prevention planning laws call for firms to do little more than adopt
“appropriate” plans, while other managementbased regulations call for firms to develop plans
that meet detailed and extensive criteria.
· Information Collection. Different managementbased strategies call for firms to collect different
kinds of information. In addition, there are differences in whether information and records are to be
kept by the firms themselves or whether they
should be released to others, including the public
or government.
· Auditing. The extent of any auditing, as well as
the type of auditor, can vary. Since the incentives
offered by different strategies are contingent on
firms taking the specified management actions,
some attention to auditing is needed. Verification
that firms have taken the specified actions can be
conducted frequently or infrequently, on an announced or unannounced basis, and by government
or third-party auditors.
· Stakeholder Involvement. Sometimes firms are
expected to engage with community or environmental groups as part of their environmental management process.
A key challenge in the development of management-based
approaches to environmental policy will be to identify
which of these design elements, or which combinations of
these elements, yield the most successful outcomes under
specific conditions. In addition, when drawing inferences
from empirical studies, the possible differences in the design of management-based strategies should also be taken
into account. Even though a research study may show that a
particular strategy does (or does not) have an observable impact on firms’environmental performance, it is possible that
other strategies with different design elements will yield different results.
Participants posited three criteria or characteristics
needed to make management-based strategies effective.
First, the user of the strategy—such as government or a trade
association—should have a clear goal in mind and communicate that goal to firms and other interested organizations.
The Clean Charles Initiative provides a good example because EPA communicated a concrete goal of achieving
fishable and swimmable water quality by 2005.48
Second, an effective strategy should be tied to metrics so
that firms’ performance can be reliably measured and compared, both over time and across firms. If the strategy calls
for actions or outcomes that are stated too loosely or cannot
be meaningfully verified, then the quality of firms’ management efforts will be difficult to assess for the purpose of
granting a reward or imposing a punishment.
Finally, to be effective, management-based strategies
need to provide firms with adequate incentives to take appropriate management measures. If the incentives are
largely punitive, such as government fines or the revocation
48. Ray & Segerson, supra note 40.
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of a purchasing arrangement, the threat that noncompliance
will be identified and punished needs to be credible. If the
incentive takes the form of rewards, the benefits firms receive must be sufficient to induce firms to undertake serious
environmental efforts. As one participant put it, any carrots
that are offered should also be the size of sticks—that is,
their absolute value should be at least as large as that of applicable civil penalties in order to be effective.
V. Involvement of Third Parties in Environmental
Management
The role for so-called stakeholder involvement in management-based strategies generated considerable discussion.49
Many conference participants called for a larger role for external stakeholders in the design and review of firms’ EMS.
These groups could help ensure that managers assess their
firms’ environmental impacts appropriately, set reasonable
objectives and targets, devote an appropriate level of resources to implementing and maintaining the system, and
put into place effective mechanisms to identify and correct
performance problems. Some participants argued that involvement by community officials and organizations in a
firm’s environmental management could deliver important,
but perhaps intangible, value to businesses. Another participant stated that private-sector managers appear increasingly
to be open to involving external stakeholders in their environmental management. Management-based strategies that
seek to institutionalize community involvement may succeed in creating ways to keep the pressure on firms to make
continuous improvements.
A number of participants pointed to limitations in relying
on stakeholder involvement. One set of problems involves
identifying stakeholders: Who are the stakeholders for any
given industrial facility? How should firms identify a complete or balanced group of stakeholders? One participant
wondered whether the challenges associated with identifying all the relevant stakeholders would even require the creation of an “administrative law at the level of the firm,”
whereby firms provide public notice of changes to their
management plans and provide opportunities for outsiders
to comment on these plans.
A further problem is that community and environmental
organizations often lack the resources to make a meaningful
contribution to companies’ development and implementation of management systems.50 Local groups often lack sufficient technical expertise about industrial operations, and
the large, national environmental organizations that possess
greater expertise lack the organizational presence and staffing needed to help design and monitor the management at
facilities across the country. Furthermore, one participant
from industry noted that the experts in environmental
groups seldom express much interest in management per se,
tending instead to focus their efforts directly on facilities’
environmental performance or the adoption of specific pollution control technologies.
49. For related discussion of the role of stakeholder or community group
involvement, see Robert Kagan et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29
Law & Soc. Inquiry 307 (2004); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaithe, Responsive Regulation (1992).
50. Alfred A. Marcus et al., Reinventing Environmental Regulation Lessons From Project XL (2002).
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A paper by Prof. Andrew King, of Dartmouth’s Tuck
School of Business, highlighted a final problem with stakeholder involvement.51 Professor King acknowledged that
environmental organizations could bring value to industry
efforts to adopt innovative approaches to environmental
management, particularly by signaling to others that a company’s efforts are responsible. This signaling function could
be particularly valuable for certain kinds of environmental
risks that lack clear technological fixes or performance measures (at least short of a catastrophe). After all, what constitutes good management will often not be clear to an outside
observer, such as a regulator or trade association, so the existence of stakeholder involvement in a firm’s environmental management lends credibility to that firm’s efforts. However, Professor King argued that the same reason stakeholders provide this credibility—namely, that their interests
are not aligned with those of industry—also limits the degree to which companies may be willing to involve them in
their management.52 In particular, Professor King emphasized that environmental organizations have an interest in
seeing innovative industrial practices adopted at one firm
diffuse throughout an industry, while businesses’ interests
generally lie in keeping information about their operations
from their competitors.53
A related issue in designing management-based strategies centers on the auditing of firms’ management practices.54 Stakeholder involvement may lend some credibility
to a firm’s management efforts, but if firms are to be rewarded for adopting certain management practices or punished for not doing so, it will be necessary to know which
firms have acted in ways meriting reward or punishment.
Who will conduct needed audits? Many participants questioned whether government agencies have sufficient resources and personnel for auditing and suggested that thirdparty auditing be considered.
Howard Kunreuther, Shelley Metzenbaum, and Peter
Schmeidler presented a paper investigating the potential for
linking mandatory insurance with private inspections.55 Insurers have incentives to conduct inspections of firms in order to make premium ratings and reduce claims. To a much
greater extent than other third-party auditors, who are normally paid for their services by the audited firm, insurance
companies have a strong interest in reducing risks. Furthermore, the costs of the inspections would be paid for in the
premiums firms pay, thus providing a way to overcome the
government’s resource constraints. Kunreuther, Metzenbaum, and Schmeidler propose that pilot studies be undertaken to assess the impact of mandatory insurance on specific environmental, health, or safety problems.56 They conclude that a mandatory insurance problem would not necessarily substitute for, or eliminate the need for, conventional
51. See Andrew King, The Role of Management Systems in Stakeholder
Partnerships, in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. National Academy of Public Administration, Third Party
Auditing of Environmental Management Systems: U.S.
Registration Practices for ISO 14001 (2001), available at
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/recent_
publications.html#2001 (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
55. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Private Inspections and Mandatory
Insurance for Managing Safety and Environmental Risks, in Leveraging the Private Sector, supra note 24.
56. Id.
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regulation and government inspections, but it could offer a
complement to them.57
VI. Management-Based Strategies and Conventional
Regulation
The ultimate question surrounding management-based
strategies is when to use them. Where do they fit into the existing array of policies and strategies for environmental protection? More specifically, what is their relationship to conventional regulation?58 Participants argued that management-based strategies can be used both to help firms come
into full compliance with existing regulations as well as to
take steps that go beyond compliance with these regulations. In addition, some suggested that management-based
strategies will, on occasion, be appropriate alternatives to
conventional regulation.
Management-based strategies can lead firms to improve
their compliance with conventional technology and performance-based regulations by encouraging them to identify
the regulations they are subject to and develop plans to come
into and maintain compliance. Such compliance management systems often include regular, internal audits to identify and correct instances of noncompliance. One participant described management systems as an “insurance policy” for firms, while another explained that the firms he
works with adopt EMS to avoid being “struck by lightening” when the government inspectors come to pay a visit.
Other participants, though, expressed doubts about how important EMS are for ensuring compliance. For example, the
study presented at the conference by Professor Andrews
found no significant differences in the reported levels of
compliance between firms with and without management
systems, suggesting that firms can come into compliance
even when they do not have formal EMS in place.59
Companies can use management systems to identify
ways of reducing environmental impacts not currently addressed by government regulation. For example, the same
study presented by Professor Andrews found that the presence of management systems correlated with significant improvements in reported environmental impacts on unregulated aspects of business—such as avoiding spills or conserving energy—but not on regulated aspects such as air and
water emissions.60 These findings suggest the possibility
that management-based strategies may be especially suited
for environmental problems that call for improved operational management and internal coordination—problems
that may be difficult to address through conventional regulatory strategies.
Management-based strategies implemented in the United
States over the last decade have all been used against the
backdrop of extensive government regulation. Several participants believed that management-based strategies only
will work (or will work best) when they have a credible reg57. Id.
58. U.S. EPA, EPA’s Strategy for Determining the Role of Environmental Management Systems in Regulatory Programs (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ems/docs/EMS_
and_the_Reg_Structure_41204F.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2005)
(also available from the ELR Guidance & Policy Collection, ELR
Order No. AD04986).
59. Andrews et al., supra note 35.
60. Id.
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ulatory threat operating in the background. For example, the
study by Professor Johnston suggested that firms in the
metal finishing industry were motivated to participate in the
SGP in order to preempt the adoption of tougher water pollution regulations that EPA had proposed in 1995.61 Government agencies can also use the existence of burdensome
conventional regulation to offer rewards—namely, waivers
from existing regulations—to firms that demonstrate responsible environmental management.62
Although environmental regulation has long been said to
have many problems, participants pointed out that management-based strategies have their own problems, some of
which might be worse than those associated with conventional regulation. One fundamental concern was that these
new strategies, especially when they take the form of government requirements for certain management processes,
might intrude into the core of business decisionmaking.
Putting management into private hands is, after all, what a
free enterprise system is all about. Government-imposed
standards on environmental management could be too rigid
and inflexible, especially in the face of changing conditions
in global markets.
Some suggested that management is too difficult a matter
for government to try to influence. Good management involves much more than a flowchart or set of procedures that
exists on paper. Instead, it reflects the dynamics of organizations made up of people and their relationships with each
other. Even the most informed government officials will not
be as well-situated as private-sector managers to know the
best way to manage businesses to return a profit and minimize impact on the environment. Moreover, government itself is far from unified, so the possibility exists that different
agencies could require duplicative or incompatible management steps.
Other participants thought that requiring or encouraging
firms to adopt management systems could hardly do much
harm, especially if they do not call for the adoption of any
new technologies or compliance with more stringent performance standards. However, these same participants also
wondered whether management systems would do much
good. Even though several empirical studies presented at
the conference showed that management-based strategies
can lead to environmental improvements,63 the substantive
significance of these improvements needs to be considered. Whether the benefits achieved are worth the costs
that they impose on economic activity has yet to be determined. One participant argued that if there are problems
with conventional regulation, the solution should be to fix
those problems—not to expect that management-based
strategies will make up for the shortcomings of the existing
regulatory system. Another participant expressed concern
that attention to management-based strategies could be used

to preempt other regulatory interventions that would better
serve society.64
In making decisions about management-based strategies,
decisionmakers should take into account the full range of
possible impacts these strategies may generate. For example, one participant suggested that one of the unintended
consequences of trade association mandates has been that
numerous marginal firms leave those trade associations that
have imposed such mandates. A similar effect may also
arise with government programs when firms take actions to
bring their use of specified chemicals below levels that trigger the imposition of management-based regulation—even
if doing so does not lower substantially their overall level of
environmental risk.65 To address these kinds of side effects,
management-based strategies should probably be combined
with other efforts by government, trade associations, and
community groups to keep firms shifting their operations
off the radar screen.
A final concern with management-based strategies focused on issues of equity—both from the standpoint of the
public as well as of industry itself. For the public, the flexibility inherent in a management-based approach may mean
that the same types of facilities could emit different levels of
pollution in different locales. Although conventional regulation may be criticized for taking a one-size-fits-all approach, uniform technology- or performance-based standards at least are uniform. For business, there is a separate
equity concern, namely that government inspectors and others who oversee management-based programs will apply
management standards in inconsistent or inequitable ways.
If what counts as good management is not clearly specified,
this will give discretion to auditors and may result in an uneven application of sanctions or rewards.66
Equity issues also arise from the distinction between actions and attitudes. Management-based strategies work by
discriminating between firms based on whether they have
in place certain easily observable management practices,
and consequently these strategies will be vulnerable to
criticism that firms are selected for reward or punishment
based on the wrong criteria. Some firms may be rewarded
simply because they go through the motions of adopting a
management system, while other firms that are really making a difference in reducing pollution could go unrewarded
because they lack the requisite formalities in their management practices.
Participants recognized that management-based strategies have both advantages and disadvantages. As such, no
participant advocated eliminating the existing system of environmental regulation altogether in favor of adopting only
management-based strategies. Rather, the challenge for
decisionmakers will be to find the optimal intervention for
the specific problems and circumstances they confront. In

61. Johnston, supra note 38. See generally Thomas P. Lyon & John W.
Maxwell, “Voluntary” Approaches to Environmental Regulation,
Economic Institutions and Environmental Policy, in Economic Institutions and Environmental Policy (Maurizio Franzini &
Antonio Nicita eds., 2002); Kathleen Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli,
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?, 36 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 109 (1998).
62. National Environmental Performance Track Program, 69 Fed. Reg.
21737 (Apr. 22, 2004) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63 and
262) (allowing facilities in Performance Track to store hazardous
wastes on site longer than they would ordinarily be permitted).
63. Bennear, supra note 33; Andrews et al., supra note 35.

64. For sources discussing such regulatory preemption, see supra
note 61.
65. See Lori Snyder, Essays on Facility-Level Response to Environmental Regulation (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the John F. Kennedy School of Government Library).
66. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6, at 726 (“The challenge for
government enforcement of management-based regulation may be
made more difficult because the same conditions that make it difficult for government to impose technological and performance standards may also tend to make it more difficult for government to determine what constitutes ‘good management.’”).
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some cases, the best option will be to continue to rely on
conventional regulatory strategies. Yet in other cases, as
some of the research papers and conference discussion suggested, there will be good reason to consider using a management-based strategy. Management-based strategies may
be particularly useful in order to influence the practices of a
highly diverse set of facilities, collect information that will
help motivate private-sector managers or activate influential stakeholders, or improve performance among facilities
or with respect to specific problems that are simply not amenable to other regulatory approaches.67
Conclusion
Management-based strategies are increasingly gaining the
attention of leaders in both the public and private sectors.
These strategies can take many forms, but they are linked by
their emphasis on improving management and thereby
seeking to contribute indirectly to improved environmental
outcomes. They hold out the promise that firms will gather
information needed to improve their environmental performance and that they will respond to their acquisition of this
information by reducing or preventing pollution. By providing incentives for firms to identify their own risks and select
their own mitigation solutions, management-based strategies are flexible and seek to use the private sector’s informational advantage for the public good.
The research presented at the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference suggests that while still relatively new
and unstudied, management-based strategies may sometimes have a role to play in environmental protection. Management style does appear to shape the environmental performance of firms, so strategies that influence private-sector
management can be considered at least plausible candidates
for bringing about environmental improvements. The studies presented at the conference have broken new ground by
empirically investigating the impact of management-based
strategies. Some, but not all, of these studies confirm that
management-based strategies can contribute to reductions
in pollution. Of course, the overall impact of any strategy
depends on a variety of factors, including the incentives it
provides to firms to make improvements and the type of environmental problem being addressed.
The research presented at the conference adds to an
emerging body of empirical knowledge about public- and
private-sector strategies to leverage managers’efforts to improve environmental conditions. The conference discussion
summarized in this Article has highlighted both the advantages and disadvantages of management-based strategies so
that decisionmakers can have realistic expectations about
what these strategies will be able to achieve. While improvements in environmental management can produce
some results, this does not mean that the results will always
be dramatic nor does it mean that management-based strategies will be appropriate for all problems.
Further research will be needed to inform decisionmakers
interested in management-based strategies. As one participant argued, just as medicine has moved toward evidencebased practice, so too should environmental policy move
closer toward evidence-based decisionmaking through
67. See generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6; Bennear, supra
note 33.
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greater reliance on empirical research.68 By bringing together leading researchers with key public- and privatesector leaders to discuss a variety of new empirical studies,
the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference has shed light
on an emerging approach toward environmental protection
and provided a foundation upon which future research can
be based.
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